One of the questions that I’ve had for months about Iraq is just how effective even a security force of 250,000 Iraqis is going to be in maintaining order. The American-led coalition hasn’t been able to control the borders, prevent thousands of deaths from suicide bombers, or stop insurgents from taking over towns in western provinces.
The coalition forces are spending billions of dollars a month on operations. Helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft have played an important part in insurgent suppression operations. The Iraqis have none of the equipment, support infrastructure, or revenue stream to maintain even the level of opposition the Americans, British, and others are. Even if all of their ground troops were capable of operating without coalition support — which we’ve recently heard that they aren’t — what’s likely to happen when America pulls out and the gravy train ends?
Then, someone decides to rerun the “Fall of Saigon” episode from PBS’s American Experience.
NARRATOR: By August of 1974, the military balance had begun to shift against President Thieu.
His troops were thinly spread. They no longer had American air support. The American military advisers were gone.
Congress had reduced aid, and South Vietnam also suffered from soaring oil prices after the 1973 Middle East war.
Gasoline was tightly rationed. Ammunition was scarce. Helicopters lacked spare parts and maintenance, and troop deployment by truck was slow and cumbersome.
FRANK SNEPP [CIA Analyst]: In addition, there was the problem of corruption, the siphoning off of material destined to troops in the field. The U.S. establishment in Saigon never had a very good grasp on the subject of corruption because it was, from an intelligence standpoint, strictly off-limits, something verboten.
We, of course, realized that if the South Vietnamese looked anything but pristine pure, the U.S. Congress would not vote any additional aid to Saigon.
And:
GEN. TRAN VAN NHUT (Army of South Vietnam): The Americans instilled in the Vietnamese soldiers and officers the American way to fight a war. Then, when the Americans withdrew and the supplies reduced, it was only natural that the morale and the combat effectiveness of the troops had to change for the worse.
NARRATOR: The Americans had spent lavishly in Vietnam. At Camranh Bay they built a two billion dollar deepwater port. Now, homeless Vietnamese improvised shelters out of its deserted barracks and clubs.
Obviously, Iraq isn’t Vietnam. The opposition in Iraq doesn’t control nearly the amount of territory the North Vietnamese did. They don’t have tanks. They don’t have an organized army. Still, with all of the technological advantages and military might of the United States behind the coalition, they haven’t been eliminated.